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摘  要 

































The purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between managerial 
ownership and earnings management of private-owned listed companies from 
2004-2006, and 1027 samples are selected for this study. Earnings management 
through discretionary accruals is seen as managers’ opportunistic behavior. Finance 
theory predicts two apparently opposite effects of managerial ownership on managers’ 
incentives. The alignment effect suggests that managers’ opportunistic behaviors 
would be less and firm performance would increase with an increase in managerial 
ownership. On the other hand, the entrenchment effect suggests that opportunistic 
behaviors would be more and firm performance would decrease with an increase in 
managerial ownership. 
By estimating discretional accruals with Jones model, we test the different 
influence of alignment effect and entrenchment effect on earnings management using 
a cubic regression model. And then a result is found that there is a significant cubic 
relationship between managerial ownership and discretionary accruals. The 
relationship is significantly negative within low and high regions and significantly 
positive within intermediate regions of managerial ownership. This result 
demonstrates the co-existence of alignment effect and entrenchment effect, and the 
alignment effect is dominant within high and low regions, the entrenchment effect is 
dominant within the intermediate regions. 
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接控制人。1999 年 7 月 1 日起开始生效的《证券法》取消了自然人的持股限制，
并强调所有市场主体一律平等，自然人和法人一样，也可以成为上市公司的发起










是 MBO 模式，比较有代表性的是粤美的模式。粤美的创建人何亨健 1998 年开
始酝酿管理层收购计划，2002 年 4 月，顺德市美托投资有限公司正式注册，成
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